Introduction
As the U.S. Navy (USN) pushes towards implementation of the capabilities called for by JV-2010 the smaller U.S. fleet and the U.S. National Military Strategy to shape the international environment is causing a greater emphasis to be placed upon multinational operations. Many countries, as evidenced by the quotation above, view multinational operations as the most effective method to achieve their political goals.
The USN is making a large investment to field the Information Technology (IT)-21 system that will bring to realization the "system of systems" envisioned by Admiral Owens. Yet there is no guarantee that the 2010 multinational naval force commander will enjoy this envisioned level of interoperability with any units other than U.S. ships. Commanders will continue to have to cope with the problem of exercising effective command and control over or coordination with forces that are unable to seamlessly integrate themselves into the U.S. Command, Control, Communication, and Computers (C4) system. NDP 6 (Naval Command and Control) effectively articulates the naval view of Command and Control. Yet, an underlying assumption to the document is that all units will be tied together by a common C4 system, something that cannot be assumed for multinational operations. NDP 6 devotes only one paragraph to multinational operations, stating that they "represent a unique challenge to naval forces in establishing effective command and control support" and concluding that the "key is to keep things simple." 2 Unfortunately, the problem is not unique and keeping things simple will only serve to reduce the missions a multinational force can accomplish.
This paper will present a methodology for addressing the multinational problem by focusing mainly on non-technical actions. By following this methodology we will be better prepared to operate in concert with minimally interoperable 3 multinational units.
Models for Naval Command and Control
The simplest and best known model for command and control (C2) is the "OODA" loop developed by Col. John R. Boyd, USAF. The observe-orient-decide-act cycle is illustrated in Figure 1 (taken from NDP 6). Boyd's model is presented in NDP 6 to illustrate the decision and execution cycle of a commander. In Boyd's view the commander first observes the environment to determine the status of enemy and friendly forces. He then orients to the environment by transforming information about the environment into an understanding of the situation (he obtains "situational awareness"). He then decides on a course of action by formulation of a plan. Finally, he puts the plan into action by issuing orders. 4 Key to our discussion concerning multinational naval forces is the implication that there is a common tactical picture that is "shared among commanders at various levels." 5 2 Department of the Navy, Naval Command and Control (Naval Doctrine Publication 6) (Washington D.C.:May 19, 1995) , 43. 3 JCS Pub 1-02 defines interoperability as: 1. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The Lawson model is more useful for helping us to understand the naval combat operations process because it includes the effect of external organizations. By using it we can more clearly understand how it is possible to integrate forces that do not enjoy a common tactical picture. There is a ready example within the USN of how to deal with the lack of a common tactical picture: the submarine force.
Submarine Command and Control
A submarine is inherently limited in its ability to transmit because of the need to remain that cannot be obtained by the submarine's organic sensors. According to RADM Jerry Holland, USN(Ret.) the C2 structure used during independent operations is based on the following tenets:
• Long range planning
• Independent action
• A well developed sense of operational methods
• Minimum communications -mostly one way
In order to successfully conduct such operations the submarine force commanders must be "accustomed to planning well ahead," be backed up by "well trained, highly-motivated subordinates," and possess a "common culture or doctrine." However, JCS Pub 3-0 (Doctrine for Joint Operations) implies that it is not likely that an integrated scheme will be adopted, especially for a coalition. Most nations will elect to retain control of their armed forces. Even when a combined commander is appointed who theoretically 10 VADM James B. 
Where is connectivity needed?
As I have already identified, the multinational commander will normally need a C4 system between the principal/command ships of his force and will need to rely upon national systems at lower levels. The first question is to estimate the number of ships that need the capability to link for multinational operations (i.e., how many navies with how many principal/command ships are potential multinational participants)? Jane's Fighting Ships lists 161 "navies" in the table of contents. The navies can be placed in four categories based on the likelihood that they will participate in multinational operations with the United States: unlikely, potential, certain, and
Coast Guard-like.
In the "unlikely" category are those countries that are not candidates for political reasons (e.g. North Korea, Cuba, Iran), because of their size (e.g. Panama, Virgin Islands, Haiti), because they are strictly a river or lake patrol force (e.g. Austria, Bolivia, Hungary), or because the United
States has no vital national interests in the area (most African navies). In the "potential" category are those countries that possess a substantial navy with capabilities that would add to a multinational effort with which the Untied States has a low probability of a wartime coalition but may need to integrate for military operations other than war (MOOTW) (e.g. Argentina, India, Russia). In the "certain" category are those countries that possess large navies with which the United States has significant operational experience, an alliance partnership, and a high probability of alliance/coalition operations in both war and MOOTW (e.g. Australia, Japan, United Kingdom). Separately, there are 28 countries that possess a significant submarine force. Of these eleven are countries with which the USN already has substantial operational experience.
Thus, there is a rather small number of countries with which the USN needs to be able to establish a substantial level of interoperability.
The second question is to determine what degree of interoperability is needed. The USN network-centric warfare design is based on three sub-networks as shown in 21 It is a Secret-level navy wide web similar to the INTERNET that will link many of the currently stovepiped information systems and allow them to be accessed from one location. It will foster horizontal sharing of information with an emphasis on users pulling data instead of having it pushed to them. If the TELEDESIC system, a constellation of 288 low-Earth-orbit satellites, is successful it will allow anyone with the appropriate cryptologic system and an approximately $5000 antenna system and receiver to tie into the IT-21 system. 22 Since the entire system is based on the PC standard commonality, as defined in JCS Pub 1-02, will be substantially achieved.
If IT-21 is successfully implemented there will be little compartmentation or limitations to access. This will be a great boon to interoperability between USN ships but will also pose the most difficulty in allowing foreign ships to access the system.
As it should be clear, most certain or potential coalition partners will not possess the level of interoperability that will exist between U.S. ships in 2010. Few, if any, foreign ships will be able to participate in CEC, making their participation in high tempo operations that require AAW and/or TMD difficult at best.
Methodology
To successfully engage in multinational naval operations with units that vary in their interoperability the USN must establish an appropriate doctrine, an ability to produce detailed plans that implement the doctrine, and practice the application of the doctrine as often as possible.
The USN must also keep in mind that most of the foreseeable multinational operations will be MOOTW, which, due to the slower pace of operation, do not demand as high a level of interoperability as war.
The more successful IT-21 is at breaking down the barriers between the stovepiped systems and eliminating compartmentation and limited access for U.S. users the more difficult it will be to allow access for foreign users. The most straightforward way to address this difficulty will be to limit foreign access to the equivalent of an INTERNET homepage (which I refer to as a "gateway") that is designed specifically for the individual country. In this way language problems and access can be addressed and critical information can be properly positioned. The foreign user could send e-mail requests to pull information from U.S. sources and could participate in video teleconferencing through the TELEDESIC link. Figure 4 illustrates the combat control process for a multinational unit with an IT-21 gateway. The USN needs to determine what capabilities a multinational naval force should be expected to carry out during war and MOOTW. The Naval Doctrine Command is already well 13 into a multinational effort to develop MOOTW doctrine for multinational operations through the Multinational Maritime Doctrine Project. 23 The purpose of the project is to create credible maritime doctrine and procedures. Commendably, the USN is maintaining editorial control, thus avoiding a lengthy ratification process. The USN should put full effort into training its forces to use the new publications and to put the doctrine through its paces through vigorous exercises.
The USN must seek security classification and information sensitivity policy changes that will remove most of the hindrances to full IT-21 access for at least our closest allies. Given that IT-21 is a secret level system the most sensitive information is already excluded.
Exercises should be conducted to determine the capabilities of a multinational force.
Focus should be placed on establishing what tasks should only be accomplished by fully integrated ships and how to provide force protection for a less than fully interoperable multinational force.
Since the Universal Navy Task List (a listing of the tasks the USN is able to accomplish in support of Joint operations) is unclassified (and downloadable from the INTERNET) all certain and potential coalition partners should be encouraged to establish a Minimum Essential Task List (METL) for their ships that is based on multinational doctrine. By sharing the METLs between navies a better understanding will be gained of the capabilities that each platform offers, which should speed operational planning.
The most important contribution of the IT-21 system will be horizontal information sharing. Anyone with access to the network will be able to access almost any information on it.
This change will necessitate a new way of looking at how a ship or staff is organized. As the USN makes this fundamental change it should keep its close allies up to speed on the lessons learned.
23 "Charter for the Multinational Maritime Doctrine Project." Naval Doctrine Command.
14 CINCs should establish as part of their Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) (or the equivalent) a cell of operators that possess the language, cultural, and gateway expertise to work with all anticipated coalition partners. The cell would collect, process, and disseminate intelligence and other support information through the gateway. Video conferencing through the gateway, aided by DJTFAC interpreters, will greatly improve the ability of the multinational commander to coordinate the efforts of the multinational force.
An unclassified publication that establishes standard operating procedures for a gateway should be published.
The USCG already works closely with many of the Coast Guard-like navies. Thus, we already have in-place the ability to work with those navies. In any circumstance where U.S.
forces need to operate with a Coast Guard-like navy the USCG should take the lead. Submarines, especially diesel types, operate independently. The USN already has arrangements with many allied nations for waterspace management and other issues. The USN should continue to build on this foundation by establishing a common doctrine for submarine operations as part of the Multinational Maritime Doctrine effort.
It is time for the USN to make regular deployments with multinational forces. For example, when a nation such as the United Kingdom, France, or Australia is planning to send ships to the Arabian Gulf we should offer to integrate them into a U.S. CVBG throughout the workup and deployment. Pearl Harbor based ships regularly deploy with battlegroups homeported at San Diego and Yokosuka; it should not be too difficult to bridge the same distances with allies.
Conclusion
As the perceived need for multinational operations increases the Unites States and its major allies must balance the tension between the desire for coalitions and the ability to rapidly generate interoperable forces. A common tactical picture is not needed on all ships as long as there is sufficient interoperability to push and/or pull the critical information to all units. By successfully concentrating on establishing solid doctrine, training on the doctrine at every opportunity, searching for non-technical ways to fully utilize existing systems, and making multinational operations commonplace through combined deployments and frequent exercises the fear identified by Admiral Smith will be alleviated and the experienced leaders and cultural commonality needed for minimally interoperable operations will be obtained.
16

